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I. FOREIGN SovEREIGN IMMUNITY AcT 
A. Elliott v. British Tourist Authority, 986 F.Supp. 189 (S.D.N. Y. 
1997); Although the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ( "FSIA ") 
mandates that a wholly-owned, funded and directed tourism 
promoting agency of a foreign government is to be presumed 
immune from the jurisdiction of United States, the agency's hiring 
of American citizens to work in the United States requires it to 
abide by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( "ADEA ") 
with regard to such employees and brings it within the FSIA 's 
commercial exception, which may overcome such presumption of 
immunity. 
In Elliott v. British Tourist Authority, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that although the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act ("FSIA") 1 mandates that a wholly-owned, funded and di-
rected tourism promoting agency of a foreign government is to be pre-
sumed immune from the jurisdiction of United States, the agency's 
hiring of American citizens to work in the United States requires it to 
abide by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")2 with 
regard to such employees and brings it within the FSIA' s commercial 
exception, which may overcome such presumption of immunity. 3 
The plaintiff, a New York resident formerly employed by the Brit-
ish Tourist Authority ("BTA") in its New York office, claimed that he 
was wrongfully terminated because of his age in violation of the 
ADEA.4 In response, the BTA moved to dismiss, arguing that as an 
agency of a foreign state, it is entitled to immunity from jurisdiction of 
United States courts, in accordance with the provisions of the FSIA.5 
In reaching its decision, the court employed a two step analysis. 
First, it had to determine if the provisions of the ADEA applied to an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state that employs United States 
citizens on United States soil.6 If the ADEA applied, the court then had 
to ascertain if the BT A was immune from the jurisdiction of American 
courts under the FSIA. 7 
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2898 (1976), 
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), 1602-1611. 
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), 
codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. 
3. Elliott v. British Tourist Auth., 986 F.Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
4. Id. at 191. 
5. Id. at 190. 
6. Id. at 191. 
7. Id. 
2
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In determining whether the provisions of the ADEA apply to an 
agency of a foreign state that employs United States citizens on United 
States soil, the court first examined ADEA § 623(h)(2), which specifies 
the ADEA's applicability to such circumstances.8 It also looked to how 
courts in other circuits have ruled on issues raised by § 623(h)(2)9 , pay-
ing particular attention to the legislative purpose behind the 1984 
amendments to the ADEA that added § 623(h)(2). 10 The court chose to 
interpret the ADEA provision of non-applicability to foreign employers 
as referring only to their employment of American citizens overseas, 
and surmised that in adopting the ADEA, Congress never intended to 
subject American citizens working in the United States to foreign em-
ployment law .11 Hence, by hiring United States citizens to work in its 
New York office, the BTA subjected itself to the provisions of the 
ADEA, to the extent permitted by the FSIA. 12 
Next, the court considered the merit of the BTA's claim of immu-
nity as an agency of a foreign state. The FSIA provides immunity for 
"an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" if three conditions are 
met: (i) it is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, (ii) it is an 
organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (iii) it is not 
a citizen of a state of the United States. 13 Plaintiff contended that under 
28 U.S.C. §1332(c) 14, the BTA failed to meet the third condition men-
tioned above, and was in fact a citizen of the State of New York subject 
to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 15 Examining the facts, the court 
concluded that "the BTA (i) was established by the British Government 
Development of Tourism Act of 1969, (ii) is not incorporated in New 
York and (iii) its principal place of business is London, England. There-
fore, under the three-part test of § 1603(b ), the BT A is an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state and is thereby presumed immune from 
8. Id. The court concluded that the BT A is a "foreign person" under the ADEA. ADEA, 29 
U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (stating "the prohibitions of this section shall not apply when the employer is a 
foreign person not controlled by an American employer"). 
9. Elliott, 986 F.Supp. at 191. See EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 888 F.Supp. 147, 148 
(S.D.Fla. 1995) (stating that § 623(h)(2) was intended to apply only to overseas operations of a 
"foreign person", not to the operations of a "foreign person" within the United States), Helm v. 
South African Airways, No. 84 Civ. 5404 (MJL), 1987 WL 13195 (June 25, 1987) (concluding 
that nothing in the ADEA indicates that section was meant to exclude United States citizens 
working for a "foreign person" within the United States from ADEA coverage). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 192. 
13. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), (b). 
14. 28 U.S.C. §1332(c) states in part: "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any 
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of 
business." 
15. Elliott, 986 F.Supp. at 192. 
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the jurisdiction of United States courts."16 The court recognized, how-
ever, that the FSIA does not offer blanket immunity, and that it provides 
for a number of exceptions.17 
Plaintiff argued that the defendant's activities placed it within the 
FSIA's "commercial ·exception," which overcomes the BTA's presump-
tion of immunity and conferred upon American courts the necessary ju-
risdiction to hear the case. 18 The "commercial activity" exception 
provides that sovereign immunity will not apply where "the action is 
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state .... " 19 In order to determine if the BTA' s activities were 
commercial in nature, the court "examine[ d] the nature, rather than the 
purpose, of the activity under scrutiny."20 The court concluded that the 
FSIA mandates that there be a clear distinction between a state's govern-
mental activities (acts jure imperii) and its commercial endeavors (acts 
jure gestionis), with only the latter offered immunity.21 In order to de-
termine which category the BTA's actions fit, the court delved into the 
FSIA's legislative history22, and concluded that the hiring and firing of 
American citizens (as opposed to diplomatic staff and civil servants) is 
commercial in nature and not subject to immunity. 23 The court ex-
amined prior applications of the rule24, and concluded that the BTA was 
not entitled to sovereign immunity. Given that the plaintiffs title was 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 193. 
18. Id. Plaintiff argued that four exceptions to the FSIA apply to overcome the BTA's pre-
sumed immunity. As the court found that the defendant's activities are subject to the FSIA's 
commercial exception, it did not address the plaintiffs other arguments. 
19. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
20. Elliott, 986 F.Supp. at 193 (citing Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160 
(7th Cir. 1987)). 
21. Id. (citing Broadbent v. Organization of American States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), Segni, 835 F.2d at 162). 
22. Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6604,6615 (stating that "public or governmental, but not commercial in nature would be the em-
ployment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel, but not the employment of American 
citizens or third country nationals by the foreign state in the United States .... Activities such as a 
foreign government's employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or 
marketing agents. . . would be among those included within the definition [of commercial 
activity].")). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 193-94. See Zveiter v. Brazilian Nat'l Superintendency of Merchant Marine, 833 
F.Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), (foreign state was not immune from a sexual harassment claim 
brought by a secretary who was a United States citizen employed by the defendant in the United 
States. Court held that employment of the secretary was not "peculiarly sovereign in nature", and 
therefore constituted commercial activity.), Segni, 835 F.2d at 165, (hiring of a marketing agent 
for Spanish wines constitutes commercial activity), Holden v. Canadian Consulate, 92 F.3d 918, 
922 (9th Cir.1996), (hiring and firing of "Commercial Officer" primarily engaged in promotion and 
marketing constitutes commercial activity not subject to immunity.). 
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"Manager of Industry Relations," and taking into account the nature of 
the BTA's business, the court found that it fit squarely within the defini-
tion of a "marketing agent," which necessarily denotes a commercial 
activity on the part of the employer.25 
Finally, the courts emphasized the need for "significant nexus be-
tween the commercial activity in this country upon which the exception 
was based, and a plaintiffs cause of action."26 In other words, the plain-
tiffs cause of action must stem from the same activity that gave rise to 
the "commercial activity" exception from immunity. The court found a 
clear significant nexus between the commercial activity of employment 
and the plaintiff's claim of age discrimination. 27 
In determining that the plaintiff's ADEA claim applies to the for-
eign state, and that the plaintiff's argument of "commercial exception" 
under the FSIA successfully overcame the defendant's presumption of 
immunity, the court held that it has the necessary jurisdiction to hear the 
action. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. 28 
B. Rein. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya., 995 F.Supp. 
325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); An amendment to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act ( "FSIA ") creating an exception to the sovereign 
immunity rule for any state designated by the Executive Branch as a 
sponsor of terrorism was constitutional, rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose, did not constitute an impermissible 
ex post facto law, and did not violate due process. 
In Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York held that an amendment to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA")29 creating an exception 
to the sovereign immunity rule for any state designated by the Executive 
Branch as a sponsor of terrorism was constitutional, rationally related to 
a legitimate government purpose, did not constitute an impermissible ex 
post facto law, and did not violate due process. 30 
The plaintiffs, survivors and representatives of victims who died in 
the December 1988 crash of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scot-
25. Elliott, 986 F.Supp. at 194. 
26. Id. (citing NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund v. Garuda Indonesia, 7 F.3d 35, 38 (2"ct Cir. 
1993)). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94538, 90 Stat. 2898 (1976), 
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), 1602-1611. 
30. Rein et al. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 995 F.Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998). 
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land, originally brought an action against Libya on the ground that Libya 
and its agents were responsible for the plane's destruction and the result-
ing loss of life.31 On motion by Libya, the court dismissed the action for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. 32 After Congress 
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
which amended the FSIA33, the plaintiffs commenced the present 
action.34 
The defendant challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction by 
questioning the constitutionality of the amended FSIA. It argued that 
since Congress (the Legislative Branch) enacted a law of the United 
States - i.e. the FSIA - which prescribed that the court's jurisdiction be 
determined in accordance with designations made by the Secretary of 
State (the Executive Branch), such law was unconstitutional.35 In dele-
gating to the Executive Branch the authority to decide which nations 
may be accorded sovereign immunity by courts, Congress acted in a 
constitutionally compliant manner.36 The court pointed out that the 
FSIA provides for courts to decline to hear cases against nations not 
designated as terrorist states. 37 In other words, the defense of foreign 
sovereign immunity can be used as a bar to United States jurisdiction in 
the great majority of cases, but a United States court is allowed to estab-
lish jurisdiction when the nation concerned is designated by the Execu-
tive Branch as a sponsor of terrorism. 38 Yet, even in such cases, nothing 
would prevent the defendant from using the defense of foreign sovereign 
immunity to attempt to have the court relinquish its jurisdiction acquired 
by conventional means.39 In response to Libya's claim that it is entitled 
31. Id. at 327-28. 
32. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 886 F.Supp. 306 (1995), affd, 
101 F.3d 239 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1569, 137 L.Ed.2d 714 (1997). 
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). 
34. Rein, 995 F.Supp. at 328. 
35. Id. Libya is referring specifically to the FSIA provision lifting immunity from U.S. juris-
diction to states designated as sponsors of terrorism by the United States State Department (28 
u.s.c. § 2371). 
36. Id. at 329. 
37. Id. Section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA mandating that "a foreign state shall not be immune 
from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case in which money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act 
of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage [or] hostage taking ... except that the court shall 
decline to hear a claim under this paragraph (A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state 
sponsor of terrorism .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). 
38. Id. 
39. Rein, 995 F.Supp. at 328-29. See Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 
103, 106 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931, 87 S.Ct. 291, 17 L.Ed.2d 213 (1966), (stating that 
"in an action against a sovereign just as in any other suit, jurisdiction must be acquired either by 
service of process, or by defendant's appearance in court, or in rem by seizure and control of 
6
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to certain rights under international law, 40 (presumably among them a 
right of sovereign immunity) the court relied on Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., where the Supreme Court unequivocally 
established that "the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdic-
tion over a foreign state in the courts of this country. . .. "41 The court 
reiterated that Congress has the authority to remove the defense of for-
eign sovereign immunity for particular violations of jus co gens, as it has 
done in the 1996 amendment to the FSIA. 42 
The court then examined Libya's claim that the FSIA violates due 
process because Libya has already been designated as a state sponsoring 
terrorism, thereby lessening the plaintiff's burden of fully proving every 
element of the crime.43 The court noted that the designation serves only 
to establish an exception to foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA, 
and in no way affects the liability of foreign states against whom actions 
have been taken, nor does it diminish the plaintiffs' burden of proving 
that Libya was responsible for the acts alleged.44 Therefore, the FSIA in 
no way alters judicial due process. This holding is instrumental to the 
court's rejection of Libya's next argument. 
Libya's next position is that since the Executive Branch's designa-
tion of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism violated Libya's fundamen-
tal right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, such 
designation should be subjected to strict scrutiny review by the court.45 
Since the court had already established that no "fundamental right is 
implicated by this classification," it opined that the appropriate test was 
whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose. 46 In this case, the court found that the protection of U.S. nationals 
property. Only after such jurisdiction is acquired, does the sovereign immunity defense properly 
come into consideration. Instead of being a 'jurisdictional' matter in the same sense as acquiring 
jurisdiction over a person or property, sovereign immunity presents a ground for relinquishing the 
jurisdiction previously acquired."). 
40. Id. at 328. 
41. Id. at 329, (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 
443, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 819 (1989)). 
42. Id. (citing Smith, 101 F.3d at 242). 
43. Id. at 330. 
44. Id. (citing First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 
U.S. 611 , 620-21 , 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983).). 
45. Rein, 995 F.Supp. at 330. 
46. Id. at 330-31. See, e.g. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 
257 (1993). 
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and air carriers qualified as a legitimate government purpose and, as 
such, no further review is warranted.47 
The last relevant point addressed by the court was Libya's claim 
that the 1996 FSIA amendment is an impermissible ex post facto law. In 
rejecting this argument, the court stated that the ex post facto doctrine 
applies when there is a possibility of arbitrary penal sanctions working 
unfairly to deprive an individual of a liberty interest.48 It is not applica-
ble to the question of whether or not a state may be completely immune 
from a civil action, and the decision by the United States not to grant it 
sovereign immunity does not bring about criminal sanctions.49 It did not 
apply to the case at bar, where the only thing established by the 1996 
FSIA amendment was "whether a foreign state is amendable to civil suit 
in the courts of the United States."50 
Concluding that the FSIA poses no constitutional or jurisdictional 
hurdles, the court consequently rejected the defendant's motion for 
dismissal. 
II. FoRuM NoN CoNVENIENs 
A. Potomac Capital Investment Corp. v. Koninklijke Luchtvaapt 
Maatschapplj N. V. D/B/A KLM, No. 97 Civ. 8141(AJP)(RLC), 1998 
WL 92416, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1998): under the forum non 
conveniens doctrine, discretion for a district court to decline 
jurisdiction is broad and the dismissal should be based on 
reasonable alternatives that would best serve the ends of justice and 
be of the most convenience to the parties. The lack of discovery in 
pretrial procedure, under a country's laws does not make that 
country an inadequate forum. 
In Potomac v. KLM, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York held that a District Court has much discretion 
to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens ("FNC") grounds where dis-
missal would best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of 
justice, and the private and public interest factors strongly favor another 
forum. 51 The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant 
47. Id. at 331 (court found that the 1996 amendment to the FSIA is a reasonable means of 
achieving the legitimate government purpose of protecting United States nationals, and it is a 
rational method of providing a forum for the victims to seek compensation for their injuries.). 
48. Id. See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272 (2°d Cir.1997), cert. denied,-U.S. -, 118 
S.Ct. 1066, 140 L.Ed.2d 126 (1998). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Potomac Captial Investment Corp. v. Koninklijke Luchtvaapt Maatschapplj N.V. D/b/a 
KLM, No. 97 Civ. 8141 (AJP)(RLC), 1998 WL 92416, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1998). 
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for wrongfully repairing an aircraft engine, which failed in a plaintiff 
owned Boeing 7 4 7 in route to Brazil. 52 The defendant moved to dismiss 
the claim on FNC grounds and the court granted the motion because the 
defendant satisfied the burden of showing that the private and public 
interest factors strongly tilt in favor of having the case litigated in an 
alternative forum.53 
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaappij N. V. ("KLM") is a Dutch 
corporation headquartered in the Netherlands and registered as a foreign 
corporation in New York.54 KLM owns an extensive aircraft and engine 
repair facility in the Netherlands and was contracted to do repairs on 
aircraft and engines operated by Atlas, a U.S. commercial cargo carrier, 
which leases aircraft and engines from Potomac Capital Investment Cor-
poration ("Potomac").55 An Atlas-Potomac Boeing 747, the engine hav-
ing received repairs from KLM, was in flight from Dakar, Senegal to 
Veracopas, Brazil when the engine failed. 56 The engine was transported 
to Amsterdam where KLM examined it and determined that it was the 
replacement blade, which had caused the failure. 57 Potomac filed the 
negligence claim in New York but the defendant argued the Netherlands 
is an adequate alternative forum and the claim should be dismissed 
under the FNC doctrine. 58 
The FNC standard is a two-step analysis which, if met, gives a 
district court broad discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction where 
"dismissal would best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends 
of justice."59 The Second Circuit emphasized the importance and pro-
cess of the two-step procedure. It explained that the court would first 
ask if there is an alternative forum with jurisdiction to hear the case; and, 
secondly, the court would determine which forum would be most conve-
nient and would best serve the ends of justice. 60 The key for the court in 
determining the second part is to weigh a variety of private and public 
factors, including: ( 1) the ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the 
availability of witness; (3) the cost of obtaining witnesses; (4) the effi-
ciency and expense of a trial; (5) enforceability of judgments; (6) court 
congestion; (7) imposing jury duty on forum citizens; (8) local interests; 
52. Id. at * 1. 
53. Id. at *15. 
54. Id. at * 1. 
55. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *l. 
56. Id. at *2. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at *4. 
59. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *4, quoting Murray v. British Board. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 
290 (2d Cir. 1996). 
60. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *4. 
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and (9) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in the application of for-
eign law.61 These are known as the "Gilbert factors."62 
The court first looked to see if there was an altemati ve forum. Po-
tomac did not claim that the Netherlands lacks jurisdiction and KLM 
went uncontested in its declaration that jurisdiction would be proper in 
the Netherlands' courts.63 Dutch law also recognizes Potomac's tort 
claim and the statute of limitations is five years; thus not likely to create 
a statute of limitations issue. 64 The plaintiff argued that the forum is 
inadequate due to a lack of U.S.-style discovery.65 But even if the dis-
covery is more limited, it does not determine whether a forum is ade-
quate or not. 66 The Court explained that litigants in foreign tribunals can 
seek discovery assistance under 28 U.S.C § 1782, which provides such 
assistance to foreign tribunals and to litigants before those tribunals.67 
When weighing the Gilbert Factors, courts generally start with a 
presumption in favor of the plaintiff as to choice of forum, especially if 
the defendant resides in the forum.68 The Private Interest factors fa-
vored the alternative forum in this case because Potomac is not a New 
York resident; therefore, its choice of forum received less deference that 
it would have if Potomac had been a resident of New York. 69 A foreign 
plaintiff is to receive less deference if the plaintiff is not a resident of the 
forum. 70 The Supreme Court has explained that because the main focus 
of any FNC inquiry is to ensure a convenient trial, deference is usually 
given to a plaintiff's choice, except where it is foreign to the forum and 
convenience leans to another forum. 71 The favored forum is the Nether-
lands because the engine is being stored in the Netherlands, all pertinent 
documents are available for review there, and 18 witnesses reside in the 
Netherlands.72 Potomac could not and did not show any such relation-
·ship to New York, except for the possible shipping of the engine (the 
61. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-509, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843, 91 L.Ed. 1055 
(1947). 
62. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *4. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at *5. 
66. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *5. Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F.Supp. 1117, 
1124 (S.D.N.Y.1992), "the unavailability of beneficial litigation procedures similar to those avail-
able in the federal district courts does not render an alternative forum inadequate." 
67. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *5. 
68. Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1996). 
69. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *7. 
70. Murray, 81 F.3d 287, 290 (2d. Cir.1996). 
71. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, at 255-56; 102 S.Ct. 252, at 265 (1981). 
72. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *7. 
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only form of evidence) to New York. 73 Common sense suggests that in 
FNC cases the litigation take place in the forum where a larger number 
of relevant witnesses are located. 74 The plaintiff tried to persuade the 
Court that KLM' s involvement in prior litigation in New York was an 
effective reason for them to pull the defendant into a New York court. 
But, the Court reasoned that such a suggestion was as weak as one ex-
pressing they should sue in New York because one of the parties might 
have a main office in New York.75 
KLM, the defendant, had the burden of showing that the Gilbert 
Factors "tilt strongly in favor of' the alternative forum. 76 In addition to 
the private factors favoring the Netherlands as an adequate alternative 
forum, so do the public interest factors. The court determined the 
Netherlands to be the most interested in this action because of the suit 
being against one of its major corporations, while New York had no 
interest whatsoever.77 New York lacked interest, and even if there was 
an interest it would not be sufficient to justify the large commitment of 
judicial time and resources it would require if litigated in New York.78 
Court congestion and jury duty factors also favor the Netherlands as an 
alternative forum.19 
The court declared that the choice of law public interest factor fa-
vors the Netherlands.80 It determined that Potomac misapplied a case to 
its argument that United States maritime law is the applicable substan-
tive law in the case.81 The court corrected the plaintiff by stating that 
just because the engine failed over international waters does not mean 
that the tort necessarily has a maritime connection.82 For there to be a 
"maritime" tort, the wrong must have occurred on navigable waters or 
73. Id. at *7-*8. 
74. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *7. Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M.V. EgascoStar, 
899 F.Supp 164 (S.D.N.Y.1995), (holding that "when the greater number and more relevant wit-
nesses are located in a foreign forum, common sense suggests that the litigation proceed in that 
forum."). 
75. Id. at 169. 
76. Peregrine, 89 F.3d 41, quoting R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 
167 (2d. Cir.1991). 
77. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at * 10. 
78. Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 261, 102 S.Ct 252, 268, 70 L.Ed2d 419 (1981). 
79. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at * 11. 
80. Id. at *12. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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must "bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."83 
At this stage, the court decided it need not determine what law applies. 84 
Finally, the Court concluded that in balancing the private and pub-
lic interest factors, the Netherlands' courts are the favored forum. 85 De-
spite the fact that this claim was brought in New York, the case has no 
relationship to New York.86 Even after all of the non-New York, U.S. 
based witnesses were considered, the factors still favor the Netherlands 
forum. 87 KLM also met the burden of showing that the Netherlands is a 
more appropriate place for the trial. 88 The defendant's motion to dis-
miss on the basis of forum non conveniens was granted. 89 
B. Capital Currency Exchange, N. V., v. National Westminster Bank 
PLC, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. 1998); Antitrust suits brought 
under the Sherman Act are subject to dismissal under the forum non 
conveniens doctrine; if the forum is adequate and the Gilbert 
Factors show more convenience in trying the case in the foreign 
forum, then dismissal will generally be granted. 
In Capital v. National, the Second Circuit held that suits brought 
under the Sherman Act are subject to dismissal under the forum non 
conveniens ("FNC") doctrine.90 The Court also found that a district 
court judge does not abuse his or her discretion by dismissing a com-
plaint on the grounds that there is another, more convenient forum. The 
Court affirmed the District Court's decision that the complaint be dis-
missed and that England is a more convenient forum. 91 
National Westminster Bank PLC ("NatWest UK") and Barclays 
Bank PLC ("Barclays UK") are English corporations that offer currency 
exchange and money transfer services to their customers.92 Capital Cur-
rency Exchange, N. V. ("CCE") is a financial company organized under 
the laws of the Netherlands which has affiliates in New York and Brit-
ain.93 CCE was doing business with Barclays UK but was eventually 
83. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 253, 268, 93 S.Ct. at 497, 504 
(1972). 
84. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *14. 
85. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416 (S.D.N.Y.), at *15. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416 (S.D.N.Y.), at *15. 
90. Capital Currency Exchange, N.V. v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 1998 WL 634783 
(2nd Cir. (N.Y.)). 
91. Id. at *8. 
92. Id. at * 1. 
93. Id. 
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refused business. CCE then sought business with NatWest UK. Eventu-
ally, it too refused to extend banking services to CCE. 94 
The plaintiffs brought suit against the two British corporations and 
individuals involved with them in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act.95 The plaintiffs alleged that it and its affiliates were wrong-
fully denied banking services.96 The defendants moved to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim under the FNC doctrine.97 
The plaintiffs argued that FNC cannot apply to antitrust suits.98 
The Court disagreed. 99 At common law, dismissal of suits had long 
been permitted where, although jurisdiction and venue are proper, there 
is another forum that is substantially more convenient; however, this 
was not true of Federal Courts until 1947.100 Even after there began to 
be FNC dismissals in federal question cases, there were some not per-
mitted under certain federal statutes, including the Sherman Act, until 
1948.101 The Court referred to the last overruling by the Supreme Court, 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §29, of a FNC case dismissal, brought under the 
Sherman Act. 102 The Court held that FNC could not be used to transfer 
an antitrust suit to a more convenient forum within the United States. 103 
Shortly after the Supreme Court ruling, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a), which provides that "for the convenience of the parties and 
94. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.)), at *1. 
95. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1&2. 
96. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.)), at *1. 
97. Id. at *1-*2. 
98. Id. at *2. 
99. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.)), at *2. 
100. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed. 2d 
419 (1981); Dismissals on ground of forum non conveniens and transfers between federal courts 
are not equivalent, since statute allowing transfers was enacted to permit change of venue between 
federal courts, and although it was drafted in accordance with doctrine of forum non conveniens, it 
was intended to be a revision rather than codification of common law by giving district court more 
discretion to transfer than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens; and Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947); The doctrine of forum non 
conveniens presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process and 
furnishes criteria for a choice between them. 
101. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.)), at *1-*2. 
102. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 372-73, 47 S.Ct. 
400, 71 L.Ed. 684 (1927); the court held that an action against foreign corporation for violation of 
Anti-Trust Act may be brought in district where defendant sold goods in interstate commerce 
through salesman, by service in another district where it resides, or is found transacting business. 
103. See United States v. National City Lines Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948); The doctrine of 
forum non conveniens is not a principle of universal applicability and whenever Congress has 
vested courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine causes and has invested complaining liti-
gants, with a right of choice among them which is inconsistent with exercise by those courts of 
discretionary power to defeat the choice so made, the doctrine can have no effect. 
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witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil 
action to any other district or division where it might have been 
brought."104 The Court pointed out that Section 1404(a) has supplanted 
the common law doctrine of FNC for transfers between U.S. district 
courts. 105 The Court explained that where the more convenient forum is 
not a U.S. district court, the common law doctrine of forum non con-
veniens govems.106 
The Court moved to apply the two-step analysis of FNC to this case 
by determining (1) whether there is an adequate forum; and (2) which 
forum is favored by the public and private interests introduced by Gil-
bert.107 The plaintiffs argued that England is not an adequate alternative 
forum because: ( 1) claims under the Sherman Act are not recognized; 
(2) it might not award damages, and/or treble damages, in an antitrust 
suit; and (3) plaintiff's common law causes of action might not be recog-
nized. 108 The Court believed that under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty 
of Rome, which are similar to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and 
which English courts are bound to enforce, the plaintiffs may litigate the 
subject matter of their Sherman Act claims in England. 109 
The Court challenged the claims made by the plaintiffs seeking rec-
ognition of money damages and common law claims. The Court pointed 
to an interlocutory appeal where the Law Lords of the House of Lords 
stated that damages are available for a violation of Article 86. 110 
Although a final judgment was never entered in the case, and the deci-
sion was therefore considered dicta, the Court considered the case highly 
persuasive on the question of whether monetary damages would be 
available to plaintiffs in England. 111 As to the unavailability of treble 
damages, the Court stated that his does not render a forum inadequate. 112 
104. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"d Cir. (N.Y.)), at *3. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at *5. 
108. Id. at *8. 
109. Id. 
110. See Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd. [1984] 1 AC 130, where the court 
recognized the possibility of damages under the Treat of Rome: "The 1958 Treaty of Rome, which 
established European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), granted to that organization the 
powers necessary to conduct and regulate trade in source and special fissionable material (e.g. 
uranium and plutonium) among the member-states;" State Dept. No. 96-85 1996 WL 361511, *35 
(Treaty); for a violation of a Wisconsin statute, "The Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act 
(WEPA) requires that all state agencies carefully examine the environmental consequences of all 
actions that constitute 'major actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.' Alternatives to environmentally significant actions must also be considered": 1995 WL 
406030, *1 (Wis.P.S.C.). 
111. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"d Cir. (N.Y.)), at *8. 
112. Piper, 454 U.S. 235, at 247. 
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The Court conceded that the plaintiffs might not be able to recover in 
England on some of their common law claims, but this does not render 
the forum inadequate and the essential subject matter of the dispute can 
still be addressed.113 
The Court agreed with the District Court in weighing the Gilbert 
factors, that the public interests favor neither the New York nor England 
forums but that the private interests strongly favor England. 114 If there 
is an adequate alternative forum and the Gilbert factors favor that forum, 
the case should be dismissed under FNC so that convenience may be 
achieved and the ends of justice may be best served.115 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
dismissing the complaint on the ground that England is a more conve-
nient forum. The Court further ruled that suits brought under the Sher-
man Act are subject to dismissal under forum non conveniens 
doctrine. 116 
In conclusion, the court found that when a district court judge dis-
misses a claim brought under the Sherman Act, there is no abuse of 
discretion if it is based on the existence of a more convenient forum. 117 
The Gilbert Factors must be the method of measurement, favoring the 
other forum. 118 In the transfer of civil actions to a more convenient fo-
rum, between U.S. district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs, but 
where the more convenient forum is not a U.S. district court, the com-
mon law doctrine of forum non conveniens governs. 119 England was 
determined by the court to be the more convenient forum and, under the 
forum non conveniens doctrine, the claim was dismissed. 120 
113. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"ct Cir. (N.Y.)), at *9. 
114. Id. at *9-*10. 
115. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, at 508; Peregrine Myanmar, 89 F.3d at 46. 
116. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"ct Cir. (N.Y.)), at *11. 
117. Id. at *8. 
118. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, at 508; Peregrine Myanmar, 89 F.3d at 46. 
119. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"ct Cir. (N.Y.)), at *3. 
120. Id. at *8. 
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Ill. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
A. Karim v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 95 Civ. 510, 
1998 WL 60949, at *l (N.Y.2d Cir. Feb. 13, 1998) (CSH); The 
Second Circuit has jurisdiction to review an adjustment of status 
decision when deportation proceedings have not commenced. The 
District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's 
exercise of discretion in an adjustment of status case must be based 
on balanced reasoning and governing law. 
In Karim v. INS, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York decided several issues: the Second Circuit does 
have jurisdiction to review an adjustment of status decision when depor-
tation proceedings have not commenced; the district director of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service's exercise of discretion in an 
adjustment of status case must be based on balanced reasoning; INA 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A) does not exclude immigrants who qualify under Federal 
Regulations 8 C.F.R. § 245.4; INA § 1182(a)(7)(B) applies only to 
"nonimmigrants" as defined by § 1101 (a)(l5); INA § 1182(a)(6)(C) ex-
cludes only immigrants who intend to mislead U.S. officials. 121 
On October 26, 1990, the Karim family entered the United States of 
America. 122 
They were refugees from Afghanistan who had been living in Paki-
stan. 123 The Karims used false Pakistani passports to board a plane des-
tined for JFK Airport in New York. 124 Upon arrival, they immediately 
informed an Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") officer of 
their true identities as Afghan refugees. 125 
In June of 1991, the Karims filed an application for political asylum 
which was repeatedly adjoumed. 126 In June 1993, when the Foster 
Nurses Agency filed an application for an immigrant petition on behalf 
of Mrs. Karim, who had obtained a nurse's license, the Karim family 
was allowed to apply for adjustment of status. 127 On December 18, 
1996, the Karims were finally granted asylum, which allowed them to 
stay in the United States, but they were denied the status of permanent 
legal residents that they would achieve through adjustment. 128 
121. Karim v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 95 Civ. 510, 1998 WL 60949, at 
*1 (N.Y.2d Cir. Feb. 13, 1998) (CSH). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at * 1. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at *2. 
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The Karims filed their first amended complaint on September 5, 
1995.129 They argued that they could not be excluded for adjustment of 
status under§ 1182(a)(6)(C) because they made no willful misrepresen-
tation to a U.S. official; they could not be excluded under 
§ 1182(a)(7)(B) because they never attempted to enter as nonimmi-
grants; and finally, they could not be excluded under § 1182(a)(7)(A) 
because although they did not have the proper papers when they at-
tempted to enter in 1990, this could no longer be held against them in an 
adjustment of status proceeding. 130 The INS moved to dismiss the com-
plaint setting forth two arguments. First, they argued that no statute spe-
cifically authorizes judicial review to adjustment of status decisions. 131 
Adjustment of status is similar to a consulate's denial of a visa which 
has long been immune from judicial review .132 Second, even if the court 
did have jurisdiction, the district director did not abuse his discretion 
and had solid statutory grounds to refuse to adjust the Karims' status. 133 
Since the Second Circuit had never addressed the specific jurisdic-
tional question raised by this case, the court looked to similar issues 
decided in Howell v. INS and Jaa v. United States INS. 134 The court in 
Howell held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the dis-
trict director's denial of Howell's application for adjustment of status 
once deportation proceedings commenced, because she failed to exhaust 
her administrative remedies. 135 This exhaustion requirement arose as a 
result of the administrative remedies available to Howell through depor-
tation proceedings. 136 Howell had to pursue these remedies rather than 
seek review in the district court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1329. 137 These 
administrative remedies were not available to the Karims, however, be-
cause deportation proceedings had not commenced against them. 138 
Also, as long as the Karims had asylum, deportation proceedings would 
not be commenced against them. 139 
Section 1329 was amended recently to grant jurisdiction in the dis-
trict courts to some matters "arising under" the subchapter, not to all 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *2. 
132. Id. 
133. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *2. See also, Immigration and Nationality Act 
§§ 1182(a)(7)(A), 1182(a)(7)(B), and 1182(a)(6)(C) (1998). 
134. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *2. See Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288 (2d Cir.1995); Jaa v. 
United States INS, 779 F.2d 569, 571 (91h Cir.1986). 
135. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *3, citing Howell, 72 F.3d 288. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *3. 
139. Id. 
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actions brought by the U.S. that arose under its provisions. 140 Applying 
§ 1329 as it read in 1995, Howell suggests that a denial of adjustment of 
status should be subject to judicial review; the court, primarily con-
cerned with the exhaustion doctrine, left that question open. 141 The INS 
did not dispute that the Karims took every administrative step available 
to them. 142 Accordingly, the court was satisfied that it could follow the 
Ninth Circuit decision in Jaa v. United States INS. 143 There, it was held 
that a district court "has jurisdiction to review a denial of status adjust-
ment" where proper administrative steps had been followed. 144 
The court then analyzed whether the district director abused his dis-
cretion in denying the Karims adjustment in status. The Second Circuit 
set the standard for determining whether there was an abuse of discre-
tion in Arango-Arandondo v. INS. 145 The court need only decide 
whether or not the INS considered the appropriate factors and came to a 
rational decision. 146 In the Karims' case, the court found all of the evi-
dence was not properly weighed by the district director. 147 The district 
director made no reference to any positive factors such as Mrs. Karim's 
nursing job, the family's clean record, or their desperate circum-
stances.148 He focused solely on the Karims' means of entry into the 
United States involving the forged passports. 149 This did not represent 
the balanced reasoning that must support the exercise of discretion by an 
officer of the United States. 150 The court held that while not every fac-
tor needed to be explicitly mentioned, the failure of the district director 
140. Id. at *4. 
141. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *4 (citing Howell, 72 F.3d 288). 
142. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *4. 
143. Id. at *3. See Jaa v. United States INS, 779 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1986). 
144. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *3 (citing Jaa, 779 F.2d 569, 571). See also Chan v. Reno, 
113 R.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding district court had jurisdiction to review denial of 
application for adjustment of status); Ijoma v. INS, 854 F.Supp. 612 (D.Neb.1993); Reid v. INS, 
1993 WL 267278 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.7, 1993). 
145. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *4. See Arango-Arandondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 613 (2d 
Cir.1994). 
146. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *4 (citing Arango-Arandondo, 13 F.3d 610, 613) (conclud-
ing no abuse of discretion occurred where INS carefully and thoughtfully weighed the evidence in 
Arango's favor. .. against the detrimental evidence; a court is not empowered to reweigh the 
evidence where the evidence had been carefully considered). 
147. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *5. 
148. Id. at *4. 
149. Id. at *5. 
150. Id. See also Zaluski v. INS, 37 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.1994); Arango-Arandondo v. INS, 13 
F.3d 610, 613 (2d cir.1994). 
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to either mention a single positive factor or discuss any process of bal-
ancing or weighing indicated that he abused his discretion. 151 
The court then interpreted the statutory arguments made by the par-
ties. The district director first claimed that the Karims were excludable 
under § 1182(a)(7)(A) because the Karims were not in possession of 
valid entry documents. 152 Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
relieves certain immigrants from the documentary obligation of 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A).153 The court explained that those applying for an ad-
justment of status are not seeking admission in the usual sense, but are 
parolees, asylees, or others who have traveled a different route to resi-
dence in the United States so they would not be required to possess the 
same documents. 154 Also, the court noted that the language of 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A) differs from other provisions of that section in that it 
speaks in the present tense alone, rather than present and past tenses, 
referring to an immigrant "who is not in possession" of certain docu-
ments.155 Other exclusion provisions used the present and the past 
tenses. 156 This change in language provides further evidence that a lack 
of documents was not intended to permanently exclude an alien. 157 
Thus, the court found that the documentation requirements that origi-
nally prevented the Karims from being admitted would not preclude ad-
justment of their status.15s 
Secondly, the district director argued that the Karims were excluda-
ble under § 1182(a)(7)(B).159 The court found this section inapplicable 
because it only refers to "nonimmigrants.''160 The Karims did not qual-
ify as such since each member of the family qualified as an immigrant as 
151. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *5. See also Douglas v. INS, 28 F.3d 241, 244 (2d 
Cir.1994). 
152. Id. at *6. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (1998) (stat-
ing that any immigrant "who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry 
permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document required by this chapter, 
and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document ... is excludable."). 
153. 8 C.F.R. § 245.4 (1998) (stating, "the documentary requirements for immigrants shall 
not apply to an applicant under this part"). 
154. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6. 
155. Id. See *6 n.8 (1998). 
156. Id. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E) (1998) (referring to an 
alien "who at any time" engaged in immigrant smuggling); § 1182 (a)(6)(C) (1998) (referring to 
an alien who "seeks to procure (or has sought or procured)" documents by fraud); § 1182 
(a)(l)(D) (1998) (referring to an alien who "is or has been" a member of a totalitarian party). 
157. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6. 
158. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6. 
159. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II) (1998) (stating that 
any nonimmigrant who "is not in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing 
identification card at the time of application for admission is excludable."). 
160. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6. 
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defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5) which included every alien except 
those within certain specific exceptions. 161 The INS abandoned this ar-
gument in their briefs before the court. 162 
Finally, the district director denied the Karims' adjustment of status 
claiming that they were excludable under § 1182 (a)(6)(C). 163 In the 
words of the director, the Karims "presented fraudulent documents in an 
attempt to gain entry into the United States."164 However, the court re-
lied on Matter of D.L & A.M. where the Board of Immigration Appeals 
("BIA") held that an alien is excludable under § 1182(a)(6)(A) only if 
there is evidence that the alien intended to present fraudulent documents 
to an authorized official of the United States Government. 165 Similarly, 
in Matter of Y. G., the BIA determined that even though the alien had 
used a false passport to arrive in the United States, because he "gave his 
real name, stated that the documents he possessed were not his own" and 
was otherwise forthright with the officials, no misrepresentation had oc-
curred.166 Likewise, the Karims did not use their fraudulent passports to 
gain admission to the United States. Rather, they revealed their true 
identities to the United States Official immediately upon their arrival in 
New York. 167 
In Garcia v. INS, the court held that exclusion under the misrepre-
sentation provision requires "subjective intent" on the part of the alien, 
involving willful, deliberate behavior."168 Although the Karims pos-
sessed fraudulent passports, the family's immediate renunciation of the 
passports at JFK airport was evidence of their honest intentions. 169 
Thus, the court held that there was no attempt by the Karims to misrep-
resent themselves to a United States official. 170 
The district director denied the Karim family an adjustment of sta-
tus. He believed the decision was within his discretion and not within 
the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit. However, the court held that the 
case was within their jurisdiction and that the district director did not 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6(C)(i) (1998) (stating, "Any alien 
who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure a visa, other documen-
tation, or entry into the United States or other benefit provided under this chapter is excludable."). 
164. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6. 
165. Id. at *7. See Matter of D.L. & A.M., Int. Dec.# 3162 (BIA Oct. 16, 1991). 
166. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *7. See Matter of Y.G., Int. Dec. # 3219 (BIA May 5, 
1994). 
167. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *7. 
168. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *7. See Garcia v. INS, 31 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir.1994) 
(citing Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972, 973 (3d Cir.1979).). 
169. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *7. 
170. Id. 
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base his decision on balanced reasoning and governing law. As a result, 
the court found that the Karims were entitled to an adjustment of status. 
IV. QuAsI-IN-REM JURISDICTION AND THE QUESTION OF DuE 
PRocEss FoR FOREIGN ENTITIES. 
A. Orient Overseas Container Line v. Kids International Corp., No. 96 
Civ. 4699 (DLC), 1998 WL 531840 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 24, 1998); Under 
the due process standards of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
third-party defendants, China Export and Shanghai North, lacked 
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum as to permit the 
exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and allow a motion for 
attachment by third-party plaintiff Kids International Corp. 
In Orient Overseas Container Line v. Kids International Corp. the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that under the Constitutional due process requirements presented in In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, third-party defendants, Frame Inter-
national Ltd., China Export Bases Development Shanghai Corp. ("China 
Export") and Shanghai North Rex-Pu Industries Corp. ("Shanghai 
North"), lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to permit 
the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction which resulted in the denial of a 
motion for attachment by third-party plaintiff Kids International Corp., 
("Kids"). 171 In April 1995, China Export and Shanghai North were 
awarded a judgment against Orient Overseas Container Lines ("Orient") 
blaming Orient for the improper release of goods without original bills 
of lading. 172 June 24, 1996, Orient commenced the present action seek-
ing to force Kids to honor the parties' indemnity letters justifying the 
release of these goods. 173 Kids then sought attachment of the money 
judgment awarded in 1995 to China Export and Shanghai North. 174 Ori-
ent now opposes Kids motion stating that China Export and Shanghai 
North have insufficient contacts with the New York forum to establish 
personal jurisdiction and allow for attachment. 175 
In 1994, Kids, a New York clothing corporation, contracted to 
purchase apparel in the amount of $970 million from third-party defend-
ant, Frame International, who was a joint venturer with third-party de-
171. Orient Overseas Container Line v. Kids International Corp., No. 96 CIV. 4699 (DLC), 
1998 WL 531840, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 24, 1998). 
172. Id. at *l. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at *l. 
175. Id. 
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fondant, Yangzhou Elizabeth Garments Co., Ltd. ("Elizabeth"). 176 
Elizabeth subcontracted a portion of the manufacturing work to China 
Export. 177 When Elizabeth and China Export did not acquire necessary 
export quotas to effect shipment of the goods to Kids, Shanghai North 
became involved and was named the shipper on the remaining two 
bills. 178 Plaintiff Orient, a Hong Kong corporation, was selected to 
transport the clothing from China to the United States. 179 
Orient transported the goods to New York and upon arrival notified 
Kids that in order to release the goods under the shipment terms Kids 
needed to present Orient with original bills of lading. 180 Kids, unable to 
locate the original bills of lading, would only receive the clothing upon 
agreement to sign letters of indemnity holding Orient harmless to claims 
brought against Orient as a result of its release of the goods without the 
original bills of lading. 181 Kids never made payments on the clothing to 
any third party defendants, claiming the garments were defective. 182 
In April 1995, to secure payment goods, China Export and Shang-
hai North commenced an action in Shanghai Maritime Court against 
Orient for the improper release of goods without obtaining the bills of 
lading.183 In 1996, Orient initiated the present action seeking an order 
requiring Kids to honor the parties' indemnity letters by way of inter-
vention and injunction.1s4 
Kids filed a Third Party Complaint demanding damages from third-
party defendants and a Notice of Motion for an order of Attachment of 
the 1995 Shanghai Judgement pursuant to Supplemental Rule B( 1) Fed. 
R. Civ. P. or 4(n)(2) Fed. R. Civ. P.1ss 
The issue presented to the Southern District of New York was 
whether Kids may attach the Shanghai Judgement awarded against the 
Orient and establish quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in this Court over China 
Export and Shanghai North. 186 The court, in considering an attachment 
to attain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, focused on two factors: (1) Whether 
the movant has satisfied the conditions for an order of attachment under 
the procedural rules; and, (2) whether the court's exercise of jurisdiction 
176. Id. 
177. Orient, 1998 WL 5 31840, at * 1. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at *2 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Orient, 1998 WL 531840, at *2. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
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over the defendants, if attachment occurs, satisfies Constitutional stan-
dards of due process. The court found Kid's arguments failed the latter 
aspect of this test.187 
Kids first argued that it may obtain a motion for attachment under 
Supplement Rule B(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Admi-
ralty) which was easily rejected by the court. 188 The court concluded 
Kids could not apply Rule B(l) because they filed no claim in admiralty 
against China Export and Shanghai North which is required for an at-
tachment under the rule.189 
In determining the acceptance of attachment under Rule 4(n)(2) 
Fed. R. Civ. P., the court reasoned that Kids did satisfy all of the circum-
stances under Article 62 of the C.P.L.R. 190 Thus, Kids was entitled to an 
order of attachment against China Export and Shanghai North. The sole 
question that remained for the court was whether the use of the attach-
ment, a procedure to establish jurisdiction over these entities, was con-
sistent with prevailing Constitutional standards. 
The standard needed to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and fulfill 
Constitutional due process requirements is established in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington. 191 The Southern District Court considered 
whether minimum contacts existed as to be "fair and just" in forcing 
foreign corporations to defend an action in New York initiated by at-
tachment. 192 It was decided Kids did not satisfy the burden of the mini-
mum contacts test as set forth in International Shoe. 193 
187. Intermeat v. American Poultry, 575 F.2d 1017, 1020 (2d.cir.1978) (holding: Minimum 
contacts were satisfied when a non-resident defendant had "continuous involvement in the com-
merce of New York, had repeatedly consented to arbitration in New York, and purchased meat 
through New York importers."). 
188. FED.R.CIV.P.SUPP.RULE B (1), ("The rule envisions that the [attachment]order will 
issue when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that he has a maritime claim against the 
defendant in the amount used for and the defendant is not present in the district."). 
189. Orient, 1998 WL 531840, at *3. 
190. Id. at *3 - *4, (The relevant provision of New York law to which the Rule points is 
found in Article 62 of the C.P.L.R., §6201, "[A]n order of attachment may be granted" when the 
defendant "is a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the state."). 
191. Id. at *5. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (holding: 
"Due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with [the forum], such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice.") and 
Orient Overseas Container Line v. Kids International Corp., No. 96 Civ. 4699 (DLC), 1998 WL 
531840 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 24,1998). 
192. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154. See, APC Commodity 
Corp. v. Ram Dis Ticaret A.S., 965 F.Supp. 461, 465 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (holding: "The test is 
whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to make it fair and just that the foreign corporation 
be required to come to New York to defend the action that was begun by attachment."). 
193. Id. 
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General jurisdiction could not be established due to lack of system-
atic contacts. It was stipulated that China Export and Shanghai North 
had no offices, employees, or bank accounts in New York nor did they 
solicit, transact, or have a license for business in New York. 194 Thus, 
the court reasoned that there was no systematic contacts and no jurisdic-
tional presence in the district. 195 China Exports and Shanghai North had 
no direct contacts with New York to show continuous involvement in 
the commerce of New Y ork.196 
The court further considered that the only way China Export and 
Shanghai North could have minimum contacts with New York was by 
the contract they both had with Elizabeth and Frame.197 Minimum con-
tacts with the forum did not exist by virtue of their contacts with these 
entities that had minimum contacts. 198 Kids argued that minimum con-
tacts was satisfied because China Export and Shanghai North knew the 
garments were destined for New York and intended to gain financially 
from the transaction in the forum. 199 This argument was rejected by the 
court. 
Ultimately, the court held that Kids failed to fulfill the due process 
requirement to enable quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the third-party de-
fendants due to a lack of evidence of purposeful acts which would estab-
lish minimum contacts in New York.200 The result eliminated a 
possibility of the appearance of China Export and Shanghai North before 
the New York forum.201 
v. WARSAW CONVENTION 
A. Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc., 148 F.3d 84 (2nd 
Cir.(NY) June 15, 1998); A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation 
may be considered willful misconduct under the Warsaw 
Convention; the liability causation standard established by the 
Warsaw Convention is whether the damages would have occurred 
had the carrier performed as promised. 
In Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc. the Second Circuit 
held that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation may be considered 
194. Orient, 1998 WL 531840, at *7. 
195. Id. 
196. Intermeat, 575 F.2d at 1018. 
197. Id. at*6. 
198. Orient, 1998 WL 531840, at *7. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
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willful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention ("Convention")202, re-
moving carrier liability limitations if found. 203 The Second Circuit also 
held that the causation standard established by the Convention is 
whether the damages would have occurred had the carrier performed as 
promised. 204 
Injured passengers and relatives of those killed during the hijacking 
of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan on September 5, 1986 filed 
suit in several United States district courts against Pan Am for dam-
ages.205 In 1987 and 1988 the lawsuits were transferred to the Southern 
District of New York by the multi-district litigation panel for consoli-
dated pre-trial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The court referred 
the consolidated case to itself in December, 1993. 206 
At trial the plaintiffs argued that Pan Am had engaged in willful 
misconduct by advertising it had contracted a security system for its 
international flights with Alert Management Systems, Inc.("Alert").207 
In April, 1994, the jury returned a special verdict determining that Pan 
Am did engage in willful misconduct in connection with Alert but the 
misconduct was not the proximate cause of the hijacking.208 The district 
court entered a final judgement for damages within the limitations of the 
Convention. 209 On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that fraudu-
lent misrepresentation can be considered willful misconduct in actions 
brought pursuant to the Convention.210 
Article 17 of the Convention establishes liability for the death or 
wounding of passengers on board aircraft, subject to limitations estab-
lished in Article 22.211 However, Article 25 removes limitations for 
damages caused by willful misconduct, 212 which the court defined as 
actions taken with the knowledge injury or death would probably result 
202. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air ("Warsaw Convention") concluded Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 
(1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 (1997). 
203. Shah. v Pan Am. World Serv., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 92 (2nd Cir.(NY) June 15, 1998). 
204. Id. at 95. 
205. Id. at 88. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. (Only one set of the plaintiffs, the Singhs, allegedly relied on these representations 
in choosing Pan Am. Sadanand Singh brought suit individually and as executor of the estates of 
Kala, Samir, and Kalpana Singh. There were several additional plaintiffs to the appeal). 
208. Shah, 148 F.3d at 88-89. 
209. Id. at 89, 93. 
210. Id. at 93. 
211. Shah, 148 F.3d. at 92 citing Warsaw Convention supra note 1, at arts. 17, 22. (Liability 
limitations under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention were modified by the Montreal Agree-
ment, approved by the U.S. See Exec Order No. 23,680, 31 Fed.Reg. 7,302 (1966)). 
212. Shah, 148 F.3d at 93 citing Warsaw Convention supra note 1, at art. 25(1). 
25
et al.: 1997-1998 Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit
Published by SURFACE, 1998
124 Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 26:99 
or a "conscious or reckless disregard of . . . the consequence of its ac-
tions. "213 The court found the Convention did not require equal treat-
ment for all passengers when only some were injured by a carrier's 
misconduct. 214 
The court then looked to the Convention to establish the proper 
causation standard for willful misconduct claims. Article 24 restricts 
damage actions under Article 17 to the conditions and limits of the con-
vention itself.215 Because there are no provisions suggesting causation 
to be determined otherwise, and as the Convention was intended to cre-
ate a uniform standard, 216 the court held it is the law of the Convention 
itself which applies to the causation question and no other jurisdictional 
standard. 217 
The court examined three possible interpretations of the Conven-
tion language before establishing the proper standard. First, it rejected 
but-for causation as overly broad and insufficient.218 This approach 
would allow a passenger lured on board by a misrepresentation of com-
fort and luxury then injured in a hijacking to file a claim because the 
false advertising caused them to board and suffer injury.219 
The Singh plaintiffs urged a second interpretation, linking both reli-
ance on misrepresentation and the relationship between injuries and the 
misrepresentation. 220 The court found that if the representations made 
had been carried out and injuries still would have occurred, the misrep-
resentations could not be said to have caused the injures.221 Holding 
carriers liable for actions that would have occurred regardless of whether 
the representations were performed as advertised would be counter to 
one of the primary purposes of the Convention, limiting carrier 
liability. 222 
It was the third interpretation which the court adopted. To establish 
causation for willful misconduct under Article 25, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate a reasonable reliance on fraudulent misrepresentation as an 
213. Shah, 148 F.3d at 93 citing Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air 
Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 812 (2nd Cir.(NY), September 
12, 1994 )("Lockerbie II"). 
214. Id. 
215. Shah, 148 F.3d at 93 citing Warsaw Convention supra note 1, at art. 24. 
216. Shah, 148 F.3d at 94 citing Rein v. Pan American World Airways Inc. (In re Air Disas-
ter at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988), 928 F.2d 1267, 1270, 1280 (2nd Cir.(NY), March 
22, 1991 )("Lockerbie I"). 
217. Shah, 148 F.3d at 95. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
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inducement to use the carrier and then show "the damages would not 
have occurred if the carrier had performed as promised."223 Under this 
definition, the Article 22 liability cap is not removed in the instant case 
assuming that even if the Alert program delivered as promised, it would 
not have prevented the hijacking.224 
Having determined the proper standard to apply, the Second Circuit 
then looked to see if this was the same one used in the jury instructions 
and special verdict. 225 The court found that while the form of the special 
verdict question on misconduct as a proximate cause of the hijacking 
could have been better worded, the district court's instructions clarified 
the question of causation with language consistent with the Convention 
definition and, therefore, the special verdict was not subject to rever-
sal. 226 Given the definition established by the Convention and the lack 
of reversible error in the special verdict handed down at trial, the court 
coneluded there were no grounds for a misrepresentation claim. 227 
The Singh plaintiffs also challenged the English translation of the 
Convention. They argued it establishes a different misconduct-causation 
relationship than the original French text does.228 They believed a closer 
translation to the original text requires the damage need only 'arise out 
of,' not be 'caused by,' the incident. They further argued that under this 
seemingly lower threshold, the special verdict is not a bar to a fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim.229 The court found that under actions arising 
from willful misconduct, the arising out of approach might be permissi-
ble. "230 But the court found it inappropriate to rule on this issue because 
the plaintiffs did not object to the jury instructions or the special verdict 
questions before the verdict was reached. 231 
In accordance with established law, the court found that all of the 
state law claims the Singh plaintiffs sought were within the scope of the 
Warsaw Convention and state law claims which fall within the scope of 
the Convention are preempted. 232 
223. Shah, 148 F.3d at 95. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 96. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 96 
228. Id. at 96-97. 
229. Shah, 148 F.3d at 97. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Shah, 148 F.3d at 97, 98 citing Fishman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 141 (2nd 
Cir.(NY), Jan. 05, 1998)(citing Lockerbie I, 928 F.2nd at 1273). 
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The court also rejected appeals related to the case's referral under 
28 u.s.c. § 1407.233 
233. Id. at 90 (The Supreme Court had recently ruled against self-referral of §1407 cases. see 
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,-U.S. --, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 
62 (1998). The court held that this ruling did not apply retroactively). 
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